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Lawrence v. Texas creates a crisis for inclusive constitutionalism. Too often,
advocates of inclusion and tolerance wish to include only those ideas and groups
with which they agree. The test for true inclusion and tolerance, however, is
whether we are willing to protect groups when they engage in conduct of which
we disapprove. It follows that the boundaries of inclusion cannot be established
simply by moral argument,* yet, any plausible version of constitutional law must
use some method to bound the people and activity that it protects. Defenders of
inclusive constitutionalism have not been successful in identifying a method,
independent of moral argument, for bounding constitutional rights. This
difficulty can best be addressed by modifying our ambitions for constitutional
law. Instead of a method for requiring agreement, constitutional law might be
reconceptualized as a method for destabilizing all boundaries, thereby
reconciling groups with widely different moral views to the political order.
It is not possible to think seriously about Lawrence v. Texasi without
contemplating boundaries.
Boundaries separate: right from wrong; male from female; free from coerced;
gay from straight; public from private; top from bottom; the United States from
Mexico; crazy from sane; politics from law; me from you.
Boundaries are the way that we impose order on our perceptions of the
universe. Without them, the world would be unintelligible. 2 Part of the project of
every preschool is to teach children what is out of bounds. Parents struggle to
establish boundaries for their teenagers, and those of us who pretend to have
grown up struggle every day with our own boundaries.
Yet boundaries are also artificial and constricting.3 (That is, after all, why
maintaining them involves struggle.) The policing of boundaries is always and
*Professor of Law, Georgetown University Law Center. This paper is based upon an oral
presentation. I have retained its informal character. For reasons that are made clear below, I am
especially grateful to Pamela Karlan for her openness and generosity in commenting on this
article. I am also grateful to Brian Shaughnessy for outstanding research assistance and editorial
suggestions.
I Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003).
2 For example, apparently people who have been blind for years and suddenly regain their
sight have not learned (or have forgotten) how to see boundaries. Many of these individuals can
"see" in a certain sense, but lack the ability to form coherent patterns out of visual stimuli. See
OLIVER SACKS, AN ANTHROPOLOGIST ON MARS: SEVEN PARADOXICAL TALES 108-52 (1995).
3 Even boundaries that we take entirely for granted restrict possibilities that we never
perceive. See, e.g., Gary Peller, The Metaphysics of American Law, 73 CAL. L. REV. 1151,
1170 (1985) (arguing that "[k]nowledge does not flow from a free subject perceiving
independently existing objects; it is constructed in the relationships between things, in the
metaphors we create," and that "'[t]ruth' accordingly depends on the exclusion of other ways of
dividing up the world, other metaphors for the way the world is experienced").
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inevitably authoritarian, even when we are our own dictators. Boundaries limit
freedom, imagination, and empathy. They blind us to the pain and desperation
(and possibilities) that lie just across the border.
Despite the century-long assault on constitutional formalism, constitutional
law remains all about boundaries. The great constitutional struggles of our history
have concerned the boundaries between legislative and executive power, between
the public and the private, or between the national and the local.4 Even at its most
inclusive, constitutional law always takes care to impose boundaries on its
inclusiveness. This is the dark side of even the most enlightened version of liberal
constitutional law. Including more groups in our moral community presupposes
that there is a moral community within which these groups can be included, for
moral communities lose their meaning unless there is something outside them.
The people remaining outside-the hidden victims of liberal constitutionalism-
are stigmatized all the more because of its inclusionary pretensions.
Concrete examples help illustrate the point.5 When the Supreme Court first
extended a modicum of protection to gay men and lesbians in 1996, Justice
Kennedy quoted from the first Justice Harlan's famous dissent in Plessy v.
Ferguson6 to assert that this nation "neither knows nor tolerates classes among
[its] citizens." 7 Justice Kennedy neglected to mention a much less famous section
of the dissent where Harlan stated, without evident disapproval, that "[t]here is a
race so different from our own that we do not permit those belonging to it to
become citizens of the United States," 8 and complained that those he called
Chinamen were allowed to ride in passenger coaches while black citizens were
not.9 Several generations later, in Griswold v. Connecticut,10 when the Supreme
Court first extended protection to people engaged in nonprocreative sex, Justice
Harlan's grandson felt compelled to write a concurring opinion making clear that
this new protection had nothing to do with the rights of homosexuals. I I And
4 See, e.g., Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579 (1952) (legislative
and executive); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973) (public and private); Carter v. Carter Coal
Co., 298 U.S. 238 (1936) (national and local).
5 The paragraph that follows is drawn from Louis Michael Seidman, Romer's Radicalism,
1996 Sup. CT. REV. 67, 114-15.
6 Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896).
7 Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 623 (1996) (quoting Plessy, 163 U.S. at 559).
8 Plessy, 163 U.S. at 561.
91d.
10 Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
11 Justice Harlan wrote the following:
"[T]he family ... is not beyond regulation,"... and it would be an absurdity to suggest
either that offenses may not be committed in the bosom of the family or that the home can
be made a sanctuary for crime. The right of privacy ... is not an absolute. Thus, I would
not suggest that adultery, homosexuality, fornication and incest are immune from criminal
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when Justice Kennedy wrote for the Court in Romer v. Evans12 to recognize the
rights of gay men and lesbians to inclusion within the political community, he
took pains to say that, of course, this had nothing to do with those engaged in
polygamy. 13
The optimistic take on these decisions is that they mark gradual, halting, but
nonetheless inexorable progress toward full inclusion. The real story is more
complicated. On the one hand, liberal constitutionalists do not really aspire to
achieve full inclusion because, on some level, they understand that boundaries are
necessary to moral and constitutional argument.14 To include everyone is to
include no one in anything that matters. On the other hand, liberal
constitutionalism's rejection of "othemess" and acceptance of analogical
reasoning renders all borders problematic.
In the wake of Lawrence, the contradictions of this bounded inclusiveness
surfaced yet again. Consider, for example, a debate between Michael Carvin and
Pamela Karlan that aired on The NewsHour the day that Lawrence was decided.15
Carvin is a former deputy assistant attorney general in the Reagan Department of
Justice who opposed the decision; Karlan is a professor at Stanford University
Law School who favored it. Unsurprisingly, Carvin's strategy was to efface
boundaries and, in doing so, to push Karlan into an endorsement of a boundless
moral community that had lost its meaning.1 6 Following Justice Scalia's dissent in
Lawrence,17 he argued that to take Lawrence seriously is to admit that adult
enquiry, however privately practiced.... But not to discriminate between what is involved
in this case [contraception] and either the traditional offenses against good morals or
crimes which, though they may be committed anywhere, happen to have been committed
or concealed in the home, would entirely misconceive the argument that is being made.
This quotation first appeared in its entirety in Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 552-53 (1961)
(Harlan, J., dissenting). Justice Harlan incorporated by reference his Poe dissent into his
concurring opinion in Griswold. See Griswold, 381 U.S. at 500 (Harlan, J., concurring).
12 Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620 (1996).
13 Id at 634.
14 See, e.g., Chai R. Feldblum, A Progressive Moral Case for Same-Sex Marriage, 7
TEMP. POL. & Civ. RTs. L. REV. 485 (1998).
15Expanding Privacy (PBS television broadcast, June 26, 2003) (transcript at
http://www.pbs.org/newshour/bb/law/jan-june03/privacy_6-26.html) [hereinafter Expanding
Privacy].
16 Id.
17 Justice Scalia wrote the following:
State laws against bigamy, same-sex marriage, adult incest, prostitution, masturbation,
adultery, fomication, bestiality, and obscenity are ... sustainable only in light of Bowers'
validation of laws based on moral choices. Every single one of these laws is called into
question by today's decision; the Court makes no effort to cabin the scope of its decision to
exclude them from its holding.
Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 590 (2003) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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incest, prostitution, and bigamy are also constitutionally protected.] 8
Realizing that liberal constitutionalism is vulnerable to this kind of challenge,
Professor Karlan rushed to reenforce the boundaries that Carvin's argument
threatened. 19
[T]here's a principled distinction between laws that target one class of
people for engaging in behavior that everyone else in the state is
allowed to engage in and laws that prohibit things like prostitution or
incest.
Prostitution is not just two consenting adults in a room. It
implicates all sorts of other issues ranging from crime to the quality of
neighborhoods to the subjugation of women. And those are not an issue
when you're talking about consenting adults alone in their own home
engaged in non-commercial intimate association with the people
they're close to. That's just very different. And it surprises me when
people put homosexuality on the same side of the line as incest or
prostitution, rather than recognizing that it's intimate association
between two people in the same way that other couples of opposite
sexes engage in intimate association. 20
Perhaps I should make clear at this point that Pamela Karlan is my good
friend and coauthor. I am not ashamed to say that, in many ways, I think of her as
a hero and a role model. Still, the arguments she made on this occasion are
troubling. It will not do, for example, to insist that gay sex is different from incest
because gay sex is "intimate association between two people in the same way that
other couples of opposite sexes engage in intimate association."'2 1 Yes, gays and
straights engage in sex "in the same way" in some respects, but in other quite
obvious respects, the sex they engage in is different. The question, of course, is
whether we should emphasize the sameness or the difference. All of the work in
Karlan's argument is done by the undefended choice to emphasize the sameness
of gay and straight sex and the difference between incestuous and nonincestuous
sex. She provides no reason why one should not paraphrase her own argument to
claim that adult incest is "intimate association between two people in the same
Justice Scalia's parade of horribles suggests a sharper boundary than I would have
imagined between his world-view and that of most of the people I know. Does he really
believe, as his dire rhetoric suggests, that social unraveling would quickly befall us if laws
against masturbation were declared unconstitutional?
18 Carvin insisted that the "logic of the [Court's] principle" meant that laws involving
bigamy and incest were unconstitutional, although he "doubt[ed] seriously [that the Justices
would] follow that logic because they are politicians." Expanding Privacy, supra note 15.
19 Expanding Privacy, supra note 15.
20 Expanding Privacy, supra note 15.
21 Expanding Privacy, supra note 15.
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way that other couples [who are not related] engage in intimate association. '22
Nor is it obvious why laws against sodomy, but not laws against prostitution
and incest, "target one class of people for engaging in behavior that everyone else
in the state is allowed to engage in.... ."2 3 Both sets of laws "target" the class of
people who engage in prohibited behavior, but not the class of people who engage
in permitted behavior. True, there is a sense in which gay people constitute a
coherent social class, while people in incestuous relationships do not. Gay men,
lesbians, and bisexuals self-identify as a group that is defined by more than just
their sexual behavior. As Karlan has argued elsewhere, laws that outlaw gay sex
are influenced by the desire to stigmatize gay people.24 In contrast, incest and
prostitution are behaviors that are "not tied as an empirical matter in
contemporary America to membership in a recognized social group."'25
This is an important point that ties Lawrence to the general theme of anti-
subordination in American constitutional law. It cannot be a complete answer,
however. Suppose that people in incestuous relationships were able to organize
themselves (or were organized by oppression) into a social group.26 Surely, this
change alone would not cause Karlan to change her views about their
constitutional rights. Some groups are subordinated because they deserve to be
subordinated. Even if (especially if!) rapists and pederasts managed to form their
own political action committees, the laws against their conduct would remain
perfectly legitimate.
This leaves the argument that prostitution produces other social evils like
crime, destruction of neighborhoods, and the subjugation of women. The implicit
assumption behind this argument is that the Constitution embodies something like
the "harm principle" that permits government regulation if, but only if, the
regulated conduct is not self-regarding.27 Many opponents of Lawrence deny this
proposition, and we need to take their objections seriously.28 Reading the harm
principle into the Constitution elevates a particular and contestable moral theory
over its many plausible rivals. In effect, it establishes an official morality in the
teeth of the Lawrence Court's own claim that the government has no business
2 2 Expanding Privacy, supra note 15.
23 Expanding Privacy, supra note 15.
24 See Pamela S. Karlan, Loving Lawrence, 102 MICH. L. REV. _ (forthcoming 2004)
(draft on file with author).
25 Id. See also Miranda Oshige McGowan, From Outlaws to Ingroup: Romer, Lawrence,
and the Inevitable Normativity of Group Recognition, 88 MINN. L. REV. 1312 (2004).
26 Perhaps prostitutes are already moving in this direction.
27 The "harm principle" prohibits government regulation of self-regarding conduct that
does not harm other individuals. For the classic formulation, see JOHN STUART MILL, ON
LIBERTY (Elizabeth Rapaport ed., 1978). Cf McGowan, supra note 25, at 1315-32 (arguing
that Lawrence is not based on the harm principle).
28 McGowan, supra note 25, at 1313.
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enshrining official moral principles.
Moreover, one reason to be skeptical of a constitutionalized harm principle is
that the concept of "harm" itself is difficult to cabin. Defenders of gay rights
should be especially sensitive to this difficulty. There is a long history of cloaking
homophobic bigotry in the rhetoric of harm.29 Gay relationships are said to spread
AIDS, promote promiscuity, and cause the breakdown of families.30 We should
recognize these arguments for what they are: deeply biased stereotypes that
cannot justify government regulation of intimate choices.
But what, then, are we to say about Karlan's stereotyping of prostitution?3'
Consider, first, the destruction of neighborhoods. It is unclear precisely what
Karlan has in mind here. If she means that neighborhoods where prostitution
occurs are blighted by the public sexual transactions, the same might be said of
neighborhoods where noncommercial gay or straight sex is publicly displayed.
Karlan's distinction works only because she juxtaposes public prostitution with
gay sex that occurs behind closed doors. But some prostitution occurs behind
closed doors, and some gay sex is public.
Perhaps, then, Karlan means that prostitution destroys neighborhoods simply
because "neighbors" do not want to live in close proximity to it. Unfortunately,
there are also "neighbors" who do not want to live in close proximity to gay
couples. Surely, Karlan does not mean to endorse this sort of bigotry. Maybe
there is, as Karlan claims, an association between prostitution on the one hand and
crime or the subjugation of women on the other,32 but critics of Lawrence claim
that consensual gay sodomy also harms its "victims" and degrades the moral
climate.33 A central teaching of Lawrence is that the right to engage in
consensual, intimate activity cannot be held hostage to contingent and contestable
2 9 See, e.g., Robert H. Knight, How Domestic Partnerships and "Gay Marriage"
Threaten the Family, in SAME-SEX MARRIAGE: THE MORAL AND LEGAL DEBATE 16 (Robert
M. Baird & Stuart E. Rosenbaum eds., 1997) (promiscuity and AIDS); id. at 119 (family
stability); GEORGE GRANT & MARK A. HORNE, LEGISLATING IMMORALITY: THE HOMOSEXUAL
MOVEMENT COMES OUT OF THE CLOSET 34-37, 123-41 (1993) (promiscuity and disease).
30 See, e.g., Knight, supra note 29, at 119.
31 Expanding Privacy, supra note 15.
32 Expanding Privacy, supra note 15.
33 See, e.g., Knight, supra note 29, at 119:
Crime scholar James Q. Wilson describes "the broken window effect," in which failure to
curb breaches in civil order leads to more breaches. He noticed that a building in a tough
part of a city had all its windows intact, unlike others around it. After one window was
broken, however, all the other windows soon met the same fate. Likewise, if a culture does
not discourage extramarital sexuality, the stable marriages are threatened because of the
erosion of cultural, social, and, finally, legal support. Plagued by a high rate of divorce,
teen pregnancies and STD epidemics, America can only unravel the social fabric further
by legitimizing homosexuality.
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overgeneralizations of this sort.34
As I hope this brief discussion demonstrates, Carvin's attack on boundaries is
an effective rhetorical device for challenging inclusive constitutionalism. Is there
a cogent response to this challenge? Before outlining what I think is the right
approach, I want to discuss three other approaches that strike me as wrong.
First, Karlan might have made a more straightforward moral argument. She
might have said that gay sex is a moral good, whereas prostitution, incest, and
polygamy are moral evils. She might have then devoted her time to explaining
why this is so without resort to the language of constitutionalism. This is an
attractive response, for, as explained below, 35 it is impossible entirely to divorce
the boundaries of constitutional protection from the boundaries of our moral
community. Moreover, for many advocates of gay rights, this response has the
great virtue of candor. These advocates favor gay rights not because they think
that we should "tolerate" behavior that is wrong, but because they think that the
behavior is not wrong.36 Surely, what really divides Karlan and Carvin is a deep
disagreement about the moral status of gay relationships, not an abstract
controversy about constitutional methodology.
This fact also explains a phenomenon that is otherwise quite mysterious: the
cold fury that gay rights advocates express when confronted with analogies
involving practices like prostitution, incest, pederasty, and bestiality. Gay rights
advocates find these arguments deeply offensive precisely because the arguments
seem to put gay relationships on the same moral plane as these other practices
when, in fact, they could not be more different.37
There are good reasons, then, to be sympathetic to this approach, but it is
nonetheless misguided. Of course, consensual gay relationships are morally
different from, say, human sexual relationships with animals, but the anger
34 At least this is my understanding of the Court's holding that "[t]he Texas statute
furthers no legitimate state interest which can justify its intrusion into the personal and private
life of the individual." Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 578. The Lawrence Court nowhere specifies the
standard of review it utilizes or the strength a state interest must have in order to overcome the
right it delineates. Still, the holding makes obvious that the liberty interest it recognizes is not
the sort of liberty interest that can be overcome by any barely rational state policy. Cf, e.g.,
Williamson v. Lee Optical, 348 U.S. 483, 488 (1955) ("The day is gone when this Court uses
the Due Process Clause ... to strike down state laws, regulatory of business and industrial
conditions, because they may be unwise, improvident, or out of harmony with a particular
school of thought.").
35 See infra notes 38-41 and accompanying text.
36 Cf McGowan, supra note 25, at 1343 ("[T]he Court only recognizes and protects those
groups whose common conduct is seen as worth protecting.").
37 See, e.g., Alan Cooperman, Santorum Angers Gay Rights Groups, WASH. POST, Apr.
22, 2003, at A4 ("Gay rights groups called... for Senate Republicans to repudiate remarks by
Sen. Rick Santorum (R-Pa.) comparing homosexuality to bigamy, polygamy, incest, and
adultery.").
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directed at the analogy nonetheless misses its point. Its point is not that we should
believe that gay relationships and bestiality are morally analogous, but rather that
inclusive constitutionalism has bite only when it provides protection for conduct
that we believe is disanalogous. After all, one hardly need resort to toleration and
inclusion to protect activity that one already supports. Toleration and inclusion are
required for precisely the activities of which we disapprove. The point of the
analogy, then, is to distinguish between true inclusiveness and self-interested
special pleading. Professor Karlan cannot claim to be a truly inclusive
constitutionalist unless she can point to a difference based on something other
than her own moral judgments that distinguishes prostitution and incest, on the
one hand, from gay sex, on the other.
It is for just this reason that the rhetoric of moral neutrality plays such a
strong role in Justice Kennedy's opinion for the Court and an even stronger role
in Justice O'Connor's concurrence. 38 These opinions do not argue that gay
relationships deserve protection because they are good. On the contrary, Justice
O'Connor insists .that "[m]oral disapproval ... like a bare desire to harm the
group, is an interest that is insufficient to satisfy rational basis review under the
Equal Protection Clause. ''39 Were this not the case, she might have added,
constitutional obligation would add nothing to moral obligation. We do not need
constitutional law to get people to do what they would do anyway. Constitutional
law serves its function only when it gives people reasons to accede to outcomes
that they otherwise oppose.
These observations lead to a second possible response. As I discover
regularly when my efforts at Socratic dialogues go wrong in the classroom, the
reductio ad absurdum technique fails if people are willing to follow an analogy
all the way to the bottom. Perhaps, then, Karlan should have done just this. She
might have said that prostitutes and their customers, people who sleep with their
parents and children, and people with multiple spouses also deserve constitutional
protection. Of course, this was precisely the response that Carvin was trying to
elicit, and, for reasons I have already discussed, Karlan was right to resist the bait.
Reasonable people can disagree about whether Karlan drew the right boundary,
but no sensible person thinks that there should be no boundary at all. Even if
incest and prostitution deserve constitutional protection, surely rape and pederasty
do not. Carvin was trying to trap Karlan into endorsing this position because it
would rightly discredit her views.
38 See Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 571 (.'Our obligation is to define the liberty of all, not to
mandate our own moral code."') (quoting Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 850
(1992)); id. at 585 ("A law branding one class of persons as criminal solely based on the State's
moral disapproval of that class and the conduct associated with that class runs contrary to the
values of the Constitution and the Equal Protection Clause, under any standard of review.")
(O'Connor, J., concurring).
39 Id. at 582 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
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This leaves a third theoretical possibility: Karlan might simply have
acknowledged that Carvin had convinced her that he was right. But apart from the
fact that such a concession would flagrantly violate the deep structure of
programs like The NewsHour, it is simply unwarranted. Carvin's argument rests
on a large non sequitur. From the premise of moral disagreement, he purports to
reason to the conclusion that collective decision making is appropriate: Because
we do not agree about the moral status of gay relationships, therefore the
legislature should conclusively resolve the matter.40
This syllogism is deeply flawed. One might just as forcefully argue-indeed,
ironically, conservatives regularly do argue-that because we disagree about how
we should live our lives, therefore each person should decide for herself how to
live her own life. No one believes, for example, that because some people
disapprove of the intimate associates Carvin has chosen for himself, therefore a
democratically accountable government Bureau of Intimate Relations should
resolve the dispute. Americans disagree about the nature and existence of God,
but it hardly follows that the legislature should choose an official religion for all
of us.
Nor will it do to claim that the boundary between individual and collective
decision making can be read directly off the constitutional text. On a practical
level, this position is deeply implausible. Nothing on the face of the constitutional
text prohibits the outlawing of heterosexual intimacy or the forced impregnation
of women. Does Carvin really want to defend the proposition that the
constitutional law has nothing to say about these matters?
Even apart from its practical problems, the position runs into serious
theoretical difficulties. We need to face the fact that the constitutional text
requires supplementation by nontextual and strongly contested moral values. If
straights are allowed to marry, does it violate the Equal Protection Clause to deny
the same right to gays? Only if gays and straights are relevantly similar. But, as
the previous discussion demonstrates, gays and straights are both similar and
different. We cannot make a judgment about the relevance of the similarities and
differences without some moral theory. Unfortunately, we cannot agree on such a
theory, and the constitutional text does not resolve the disagreement.
Perhaps Carvin thinks that in the absence of text, the default position should
be collective decision making, but this returns us to the non sequitur with which
we started. Moreover, it robs the Equal Protection Clause of any independent
force-a position that is, itself, in contravention of the text. This is so because if,
for instance, some other provision of the Constitution guaranteed a right to gay
marriage, resort to the Equal Protection Clause would be superfluous. Equal
protection analysis does work only in cases where other constitutional text
provides no protection, but it is in just these cases that the text fails to resolve the
moral issues of likeness and difference on which equal protection analysis
40 Expanding Privacy, supra note 15.
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depends. It follows that if we are to be loyal to the text of the Equal Protection
Clause, we must also be loyal to some set of norms that is not specified by the
text.
Thus, none of these alternative stances is entirely satisfactory. Unfortunately,
though, rejecting them leaves us in an uncomfortable position. We seem driven to
the following three conclusions:
1. Even inclusive constitutionalism must be bounded in some way if it is to
be at all attractive;
2. If constitutionalism is to provide an independent reason for action, then
there must be some gap between the boundaries that it requires and boundaries
based on our own moral beliefs-boundaries that we would draw in any event
even if there were no constitutional obligation;
3. The boundaries that constitutionalism demands cannot be drawn without
reliance on the moral beliefs that constitutionalism excludes.
These three propositions form the contradiction at the core of inclusive
constitutionalism, and there is no simple rhetorical move that will make the
contradiction go away. Is there nonetheless a coherent response to this challenge?
Such a response might begin by modifying our ambitions for constitutional
law. So far, we have assumed that the point of the exercise is to provide
constitutional grounds that will cause Karlan and Carvin to agree about the proper
outcome of Lawrence. Of course, this is not the point of the exercise. Karlan and
Carvin are not on The NewsHour so that they will agree. Moreover, trying to get
them to agree is a waste of time. Perhaps others, who are less deeply committed
than Karlan and Carvin, will eventually change their minds about the status of gay
relationships, but it is unlikely that even they will do so because of a
constitutional argument. In our culture, constitutional arguments about divisive
social issues reflect, rather than settle, our differences.
What, then, is a more realistic ambition for constitutional argument? Even if
Karlan and Carvin cannot agree, perhaps they can come away from their
encounter with a better understanding of each other's positions. The wall
separating them cannot be dismantled, but it might be eroded to an extent that
would allow them to perceive a just basis for accepting defeat on an issue about
which they are deeply committed.
Oddly, inclusive constitutionalism's contradictory relationship to boundaries
might help to produce an environment where this attitude takes hold. On the one
hand, we need to understand that constitutional law requires boundaries even
when they are contested. On the other hand, inclusive constitutionalism
destabilizes the very boundaries it insists upon. This destabilization means that
those who remain out of bounds can retain a justified hope that the lines may be
moved yet again. A similar understanding by the victors in our constitutional
struggles might cause them to recognize that their victory is temporary and that no
boundaries are beyond challenge.
So how would I have responded to Carvin's argument? I should acknowledge
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at the outset that if I were good at this sort of thing, I might have been invited on
The NewsHour instead of Pamela Karlan. Alas, my best responses tend to come
to me the next day in the shower. Fortunately, I have had quite a few showers
since I watched the program, so by now I have a pretty good response. It goes
something like this:
Does it seem to me that gay relationships are like incest and prostitution?
Well, no, just as, I must concede, it doesn't seem to you, Mr. Carvin, that gay
relationships are like straight relationships. Can I defend that position without a
contestable moral theory? Of course not. We all have our boundaries, even if we
draw the lines in different places, and those boundaries cannot be drawn without
reference to some moral theory. I have to confess that the realization that I, like
you, am bounding the moral community leaves me a little more sympathetic to
your fear and outrage that a boundary has been breached. I know you will like
that, but I must add that it also causes me to push on moral boundaries in the other
direction. At least at the margin, it also makes me more sympathetic to people
engaged in a variety of other non-mainstream sexual practices of which I
currently disapprove.
It is important to understand that this sort of destabilization of boundaries
does not mean giving up on our moral positions. I still think that good gay sex is,
in important moral respects, "like" good straight sex and unlike, say, bad gay or
straight sex or "good" prostitution if, indeed, there is such a thing. But
destabilization does mean giving up some of our moral outrage. That is too bad. I
like my moral outrage as much as the next person, and it is moral outrage, after
all, that fuels political engagement and social change. But outrage also requires a
suspension of imagination. It is hard to be too angry at Michael Carvin if I can
manage to see that, if a few things had gone somewhat differently in my life, I
would have views similar to his. It is just this kind of moral imagination that holds
the best hope of supporting a structure that we can justly impose upon a diverse
populace with widely differing moral views.
To badly paraphrase Robert Frost, "the something there is that doesn't love a
wall" is the best version of our constitutional tradition.41 We reenforce that
tradition when we argue for the "right" boundaries, even as we recognize the
contingency and uncertainty of our own arguments. This sobering point is
especially worth remembering at the very moment when, flush with victory, we
celebrate the Lawrence Court's willingness to breach a boundary that has caused
so much misery, for so many, for so long.
41 Robert Frost, Mending Wall, in THE CLASSic HUNDRED POEMS: ALL-TIME FAVORITES
230 (William Harmon ed., 1998).
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